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ABSTRACT
During two research projects to identify the difficulties associated with information
systems planning (ISP), it became apparent that IS managers and users often do not apply
a number of commonly accepted guidelines for successful ISP. This paper reports some
instances in which the guidelines were not applied. It also explains the neglect of the
guidelines and the incentives ISP participants had for not applying them. The findings
suggest further research and also have practical implications for IS managers.
INTRODUCTION some of the reasons why ISP is not as effective
as managers would like.
Information systems management has become
increasingly complex in recent years (McFarlan
and McKenney, 1982). At operational levels, the
growing sophistication of hardware and soft- BENEFITS OF IS PLANNINGware enables more and more intricate systems to
be implemented. This places severe demands on
scheduling and resource deployment skills. At The need for ISP was recognized as early as
strategic levels, firms are attempting to use in- 1969 and the benefits of formalized ISP have
formation to gain an advantage over their com- been documented (Blumenthal, 1969). For ex-
petitors (Benjamin, et al. 1984; Ives and Lear- ample, a study showed that 16 of 18 successful
month, 1984). Thus top management must con- computer users (out of a sample of 36 users) had
sider the impact of information on the organiz- formalized plans for their data processing activ-
ation as a whole during the strategic planning ities (McKinsey and Co., 1968). In addition, an
process. In addition, some firms have become A.T. Kearney study reported that companies
so dependent upon their automated systems that with integrated business and IS strategic plans
they cannot operate when their computers fail financially outperformed those without these
(Gifford and Spector, 1984). plans by a factor of six to one (Ball, 1982).
Given this increased complexity and depen- The benefits of ISP are clear. A 1982 study fur-
dence, the urgency to successfully perform in- ther substantiated the importance of ISP by
formation systems planning (ISP) has grown finding that the MIS long range plan itself,
dramatically for all levels of the organization. together with its integration into the business
However, as shown later, ISP remains a critical plan, was a top priority with both professionals
 ssue with IS managers. This paper explores and academics (Ball and Harris, 1982). Two
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years later a sample drawn from eight industries believed in the guidelines of ISP, and invariably
confirmed these concerns (Dickson, et al„ tried to implement them, their ISP efforts were
1984). In light of these findings, the authors sometimes less successful than desired. Indeed,
designed two research projects to provide exten- the IS executives indicated that ISP participants
sive face-to-face contact with IS managers to at times followed a course of action virtually op-
probe the difficulties of ISP. posite to that proposed by the guidelines. These
cases represented paradoxes because the widely
accepted guidelines for effective ISP either
failed or were not applied.
METHODOLOGY
Furthermore, the participants in this study were
The first research project involved 24 IS profes- experienced and capable IS executives whose
sionals drawn from the top, middle, and operat- self-confidence permitted them to express their
ing levels of MIS management. Each manager views honestly. The neglect of the guidelines by
participated in one of three group sessions, their organizations is assumed to be repre-
depending on his or her management level. sentative of other firms.
During these sessions the Nominal Group Tech-
nique (NGT) (Delbecq and Van de Ven, 1975)
was used to elicit the difficulties which the The research suggested that the paradoxes may
managers faced in developing their IS plans be explained, at least in part, by the incentives
(Lederer and Mendelow, forthcoming). The re- which motivate ISP participants. Expectancy
sults of these NGT sessions were used to con- theories of motivation indicate that workers act
struct a comprehensive list of the most impor- to obtain rewards (Porter and Lawler, 1968).
tant difficulties. Table 1 shows the list. The application of expectancy theory to the ISPenvironment suggests that a paradox will arise if
the reward for adhering to the guideline is less
This list was then used as the basis for a series of than the reward for doing otherwise. Clearly if
structured, indepth interviews with twenty ISP is to be successful, these paradoxes must be
senior MIS executives from a variety of in- resolved. This paper describes a selection of
dustries (Lederer and Mendelow, 1986). Table 2 nine significant guidelines of ISP, the paradoxes
describes the participating firms. During the in- often associated with each, and how incentives
terviews, which lasted about three hours, the ex- cause the paradoxes. Despite the paradoxes, the
ecutives were asked why each item on the list intent of the paper is not to discredit the
would be a difficulty and how it could be over- guidelines but rather to explain why they some-
come. In the course of these interviews it be- times fail or are not applied. The guidelines
came clear that there were serious flaws in some should still be followed.
of the underlying tenets of ISP when applied in
practice.
The underlying tenets of ISP have been
developed by both practitioners and academics GUIDELINES, PARADOXES
to act as guidelines to achieve the benefits as- AND INCENTIVES
sociated with the successful development and
implementation of ISP. In addition to
guidelines specifically applicable to ISP. further Develop a Formal Information
prescriptions were borrowed from general Systems Plan
management and incorporated into the lore of
ISP. Over the years these guidelines have be- This guideline is clearly very trite. Professors in
come accepted. They are widely quoted in jour- elementary management courses teach thatnal articles, trade magazines, textbooks and planning is a primary function of management.
monographs. Professors teach them to their stu- In fact research has demonstrated that organiz-
dents. Consultants prescribe them to their ations which develop formal information sys-
clients. Generally the guidelines are very well tems plans are generally more successful thanknown (indeed, almost trite) and remain un- organizations which do not (Ball, 1982; Davis
questioned. and Olson, 1985; McLean and Soden, 1977).
During the research project it became evident Planning involves setting objectives and policiesthat although the participants passionately to enable an organization or department to
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Table 1. ISP Difficulties
1. Determining top management's objectives.
2. Getting top management to understand that there exists a strategic role for information
systems.
3. Determining the end users' needs.
4. Responding to both the short-term and long-term impact of changing environmental
factors such as:
a. new technology
b. government regulation
c. competitors' actions
d. the market
e. the user and the workforce
5. Establishing and maintaining priorities.
6. Coordinating information systems plans and priorities with corporate plans and
priorities.
7. Estimating requirements for:
a. hardware
b. labor
c. skills
d. training
e. space
f. travel
8. Matching people to each project.
9. Allocating resources to new versus maintenance projects.
10. Obtaining support and commitment for resources from:
a. theusers
b. the information systems department
c. top·management
11. Implementing a planning methodology.
12. Maintaining flexibility in the planning process (ongoing nature of IS projects vs the
discrete character of planning systems).
13. Justifying projects and their funding.
14. Planning for security and disaster.
15. Getting plans accepted.
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Table 2. Profiles of the Companies .
1. A university providing undergraduate, graduate and professional education through 16
schools with an enrollment of over 27,000.
2. A manufacturer providing products and services to the construction industry with gross
revenues of nearly $2 billion in 1984.
3. A worldwide manufacturer and marketer of processed food products with gross revenues
of nearly $4 billion in 1984.
4. A steel producer with sales of a wide variety of steel mill products with gross revenues of
$19 billion in 1984.
5. A multi-national producer of glass, chemicals, coatings, resins and fiber glass with net
sales over $4 billion in 1984.
6. An explorer, producer and distributor of natural gas with gross revenues of $3.5 billion
in 1984.
7. A coal producer with gross revenues of $1.6 billion in 1984.
8. A multinational diversified manufacturer of consumer and specialty products with gross
revenues of over $2 billion in 1984.
9. A bank with domestic retain, worldwide commercial, trust and financial management
services with assets over $30 billion in 1984.
10. A manufacturer of polyurethane raw materials, plastics, chemicals, dyes and pigments
with net sales of over $1.5 billion in 1984.
11. A residential, commercial and industrial natural gas distributor.
12. A specialty food chain with gross revenues of $390 million in 1984.
13. A corporation providing energy, advanced technology, and broadcasting with gross
revenues of over $10 billion in 1984.
14. An association providing standards and technical guidance to the transportation in-
dustry.
15. A provider of medical insurance to 2.6 million subscribers.
16. An urban hospital with over 550 beds.
17. A savings bank with total deposits of over $2 billion in 1984.
18. A privately held firm specializing in the management of large construction products.
19. A county government serving approximately 1.5 million people.
20. A retail drug chain with operations in 20 states.
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deploy its resources effectively and efficiently to The link between the IS plan and the corporate
achieve its goals. The act of planning requires plan can be achieved in three dimensions-
making risk-taking decisions at the present time timing, content and personnel (Shank, et al,
with the best possible knowledge of their out- 1973). For example, the IS plan can be
comes (Drucker, 1979). Clearly, without plan- developed before, during or after the corporate
ning it is very difficult to achieve anything at plan. While each of these options has ad-
all. vantages and disadvantages, ideally the IS plan
should be developed during the corporate plan-
The Paradox All too often, interviewees stated ning process.
that daily crises take precedence over planning.
1n one instance during the first phase of the Furthermore, if the information services depart-
study, a manager declined to attend an NGT ses- ment (ISD) is to support the needs of the organ-
sion two weeks hence because he said that al- ization, those needs should be reflected in the
though he felt the meeting would be valuable, content of the IS plan. Conversely, the resources
he knew that on that day he would be "running required by the ISD to meet corporate needs
around like a chicken with its head cut off put- should appear in the corporate plan. Thus there
ting out fires" even though he did not know the must be a consistency between the content of the
specific crisis he would face. IS plan and that of the corporation.
In some cases, IS managers flatly stated that Finally, people can also act as a link. Personnel
they did not have time to perform the same involved in the development of the corporate
planning methodologies which their peers at plan should also participate in the creation of
other firms claimed to have successfully com- the IS plan.
pleted. In summary, planning will save time in
the long term but there often is no time to plan! The Paradox Interviewees frequently indicatedthat their firms did not have a suitable corporate
The Incentives These comments suggest that in plan with which to link. In some cases, they
many organizations, the rewards for planning had no corporate plan at all. In other case
s, the
do not outweigh the sanctions for the failure to corporate plans were glittering generalities or
plan. That is, the rewards for short-term suc- mere financial targets which
could not be trans-
cesses outweigh the rewards for long-term re-
lated into IS plans. Some interviewees also
sults. Furthermore, interviewees revealed that stated that top executives liked to maintain con-
planning is not particularly gratifying. Well- fidentiality of the plan. If top managers had a
thought out plans might never be executed, plan, they might have been rel
uctant to share it
whereas the development of new systems ac. with the IS department for fear of its possible
tually demonstrates tangible, daily progress. disclosure to competitors. In addition, some i
n-
Pay raises and promotions probably rely more terviewees maintained that top executives
heavily on tangible accomplishments im- preferred flexibility which is lost when a plan is
mediately preceding evaluation than on care- written. Written plans are more difficult to
fully thought-out plans which may favorably change. Thus the paradox is that linking, al-
impact the company in the distant future. The though mandatory, is imp
ossible without a cor-
need for short-term results subverts efforts to Porate plan.
formalize information systems plans. The Incentives One interviewee demanded a for-
mal plan from top management by pointing out,
"If you don't give me a written plan I can use, I
can't get you the value that computers can
Link the IS Plan to the Corporate Plan provide!" This comment illustrates the need for
IS managers to demonstrate the benefits of for-
The IS department should attempt to achieve mal plans. IS managers must convince top
the organization's goals and must adhere to cor- management that the value of the formal plan
porate policies (McFarlan, 1971; Pyburn, 1983). outweighs the value of confidentiality and flexi-
By ignoring the goals and policies of the organ- bility so that top management has the incentive
ization, it is impossible to deploy resources ef- to develop a corporate plan. Indeed, the par-
ficiently to support corporate objectives (King, ticipant quoted above succeeded in his urging
1978). Linking the IS plan to the corporate plan and top management began developing a formal
facilitates an optimal project mix. plan.
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Plan for Disaster 1974; Scott, 1986). The primary objective of
this effort is to learn from previous mistakes so
Organizations should plan for disaster because that they are never repeated. Also, developers
damage to facilities, hardware, software and should learn from their successes so they can be
data can seriously affect the operations of the repeated. Furthermore, such audits may identify
organization. Damage can result from natural instances where small additional resource out-
causes, equipment malfunction or willful acts lays for fine tuning can result in significant
(Allen, 1968; Burch, et al. 1983; Van Tassel, gains from the new system.1982).
The Paradox Auditing requires time, energy and
Disaster planning is growing in importance as people. These resources could be used for ap-
organizations become increasingly dependent on plication development. Several interviewees
IS. Indeed, interviewees indicated that some of flatly stated that they do not audit new systems
their users had forgotten how to operate their and therefore do not learn from their mistakes,
original manual systems after relying on and therein lies the paradox.
computer-based systems for several years. As a
result, the impact of a disaster could be espe- The Incentives Interviewees indicated that their
cially severe. Users simply would not know what top managers and users had a backlog of
to do and the company could cease to function. projects which they are eager to implement.
The rewards and the pressures for starting new
The Paradox The probability of disaster is projects exceed the rewards and pressures for
rather minute and the cost of a disaster plan is completing and auditing old projects with the
rather high. Disaster planning represents in- quality that many IS managers would like.
surance against disaster, but unlike life in-
surance its payoff is not guaranteed. Some par-
ticipants related that when their top manage-
ment declined their request for resources for dis- Economic Feasibility Precedesaster planning, they did not push the matter
despite its importance. After all, although a dis- Development
aster plan is highly recommended, its expected
value is near zero. This guideline dictates that developers should
identify costs and benefits before deploying sig-
nificant resources to analyze and design newThe Incentives Many participants indicated that systems. Where the benefit-to-cost ratio is in-the greatest rewards in their firms accrue from sufficient, intangible benefits may be used todeveloping applications which contribute sig- bolster the case of a proposed system. The jus-nificantly to the organization's effectiveness and tification of a project before its analysis andnot from providing good insurance policies. design is an attempt to ensure that the desired
returns are obtained from the deployment of re-
In one particular case, a participant stated that sources (Emery, 1982).
nine of ten IS managers claim to have a great
disaster plan. But what they really have is their The Paradox Often, systems developers cannot
resume in their hip pocket. In the unlikely or do not understand the returns from a newevent of disaster, these IS managers feel that system until it has been designed. It is difficult
they can get a new job very quickly. Then he to forecast returns without a good picture of thestated that he too had a greatdisaster plan! final product. Many companies require their
users to perform cost justifications. However,
interviewees mentioned that users frequently ex-
perience difficulty conceptualizing a new system
in sufficient detail to determine financialAudit New Systems savings. Without a justification, many systems
will never be developed. Thus the ISD some-
According to the system development life cycle times depends on users for accomplishments
approach, several months after a new system which the users cannot perform (at least alone).
has been in production and has become stable, In addition to the difficulty of dealing with
IS auditors should examine it to determine how quantifiable benefits, the issue is complicated by
well it has realized the expected benefits (Davis, intangible benefits which are even more dif-
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ficult to predict. In summary, the paradox is systems development, contract programmers did
that although systems developers should identify not have the necessary background with existing
the costs and benefits of a proposed system prior applications to handle the· maintenance tasks.
to its development, they often are unable to do Gaining this background requires time and is
so because they do not yet fully understand its therefore costly. Hence managers often assign
objectives and outputs. contract programmers to new development.
The Incentive Sometimes the reward for a good The Incentives While the guideline suggests
feasibility study is the authorization to begin a training analysts and programmers for greater
new project. Such authorization occurs because responsibility, it is often less costly, at least in
the analysts and users "found"the savings, but the short-run, to keep in-house IS staff assigned
not because their projections were accurate. to maintenance. Thus the growth of the IS
One participant mentioned that his training in department staff is curtailed.
accounting made it almost too easy for him to
justify new projects. He claimed to be able to
justify almost anything regardless of whether or
not the returns really existed. Therefore, posi- Be Prepared to Change
tive ROI often gets better rewards than accurate
ROI. The accelerating change in the environment is
widely recognized. Organizations alter their
products and their markets in response to this
change. New products and markets in turn of-
Grow Your Staff ten result in altered reporting relationships
within the organization. Thus information sys-
IS managers should expand the technical, busi- tems must be modified or redesigned to serve the
ness and managerial skills of their staff (Cash, changed organization. In the final analysis, be-
et al. 1983; Couger and Zawacki, 1978). ing prepared to change is simply a matter of sur-
Managers must challenge their subordinates vival. Despite this, the ISD must be able to cope
with more and more responsibility. Systems with user resistance to change arising from new
professionals are an investment. They were ex- systems and procedures.
pensive to hire. Over time they become familiar
with the organization's users and their applica- The Paradox In some respects, IS specialists are
tions. They would be expensive to replace. very similar to users. According to several inter-
viewees, IS experts hate change; this confirms a
The Paradox Many interviewees pointed out view held by Dickson and Wetherbe (1985).
that generally those who develop a system are Change within ISD consumes resources which
often also held responsible for its maintenance. might be used for applications development.
It is economically wasteful for new analysts and Moreover, the effects of the change may not be
programmers to expend time and energy learn- visible to the users. For example, one inter-
ing the details of a system when its original de- viewee was considering upgrading his IBM
velopers are available and have the necessary DOS/VSE (Disk Operating System/Virtual Sys-
expertise. The paradox is that although tem Extended) to MVS (Multiple Virtual
development offers greater challenge and System). The change would degrade user service
responsibility and analysts and programmers during implementation. After implementation,
prefer development to maintenance, they are users would be unlikely to experience any im-
nevertheless burdened with maintenance provement in service.
responsibilities.
Similarly, other interviewees suggested that
Furthermore, the shortage of trained staff ex- many of their programmers and analysts would
acerbates the problem. To reduce the effects of prefer to solve problems using old computer lan-
staff shortages, particularly during peak guages and methodologies rather than take the
periods, many interviewees reported hiring con- time and effort to learn new tools.
tract programmers. Although interviewees
would have preferred to assign contract Nonetheless, the ISD exists as a result of
programmers to maintenance tasks so that in- change. Change keeps IS professionals
house staff could have the growth potential of employed. The paradox here is that the ISD re-
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quires its users to change but prefers to remain The Incentives Clearly the users' incentive to
stable. cooperate in the definition of needs arises too
late in the systems development life cycle. By
The Incentives Once again incentives (or their the time users decide to apply resources to the
lack) explain the situation. Clearly, the status definition of their needs, the design may be
quo appears more rewarding than new alter- locked in place. Any alterations will probably
natives. People feel comfortable with what they cost both time and money. The incentive to par-
know. They fear the unknown. Until rewards ticipate early must outweigh the incentive to
for change outweigh sanctions to remain con- wait.
stant, IS experts should expect no more of their
users than they expect of themselves.
Establish Credibility via Successes
Systems managers should establish a record of
The ISD Should Satisfy Users' Needs successful contributions to their organizations.
They should promote their successes. Then
Guidelines for systems development state that users and other managers will believe their fu-
systems developers should first understand ture promises and provide cooperation when it
users' jobs in great detail. Then developers is required (Powers and Dickson, 1973; Doll and
should create systems to aid users to do their Ahmed, 1983). Interviewees unanimously stated
jobs more effectively and efficiently (Zani, that credibility is crucial to the success of the IS
1970). If new systems fail to satisfy users' effort.
needs, they might be underutilized or not used at
ali (Ackoff, 1967). The Paradox Some interviewees intimated that
an occasional and not too costly failure some-
The Paradox Some interviewees suggested that times strengthens the ISD's case for more re-
user needs are often undefinable. In many cases sources. Credibility can be enhanced if an IS
users do not really know their needs. Users can failure clearly results from the lack of requested
be highly effective without specifically consider. resources which top management failed to au-
ing the information which they require. thorize. Building credibility requires time and
effort. But the paradox is that an occasional
and predicted failure may help to get needed re-In addition, bad experiences with IS have sources!caused some users to be skeptical about ISD re-
guests. Users often question whether newly in-
itiated systems will ever be completed. They The Incentives More than one participant stated
tend to expend as few resources as possible that a series of moderate successes do not create
when information needs are identified in detail the visibility which is a prerequisite for promo-
during the early analysis and design phases. tions and pay increases in many organizations.
This results in a poor definition of user needs. Well functioning information systems become
However, as development proceeds and users see transparent because they do not present pro-
the increasing likelihood of implementation, blems to users and managers. The incentive is
they give additional thought to their infor. for visibility and an occasional, minor failure
mation needs. Hence, the needs of the user ap- might just help.
pear to change during development.
The problem of creeping expectations leads to
user dissatisfaction. Before a system begins pro- CONCLUSIONSduction, the user may have little appreciation of
its potential. However, once the system is up
and running, the user often begins to see the Information systems planning remains a key is-
potential and becomes dissatisfied that it is not sue for management (Dickson, et al., 1984). IS
being realized. Thus the paradox is that by the managers rely on guidelines to expedite the
time users are willing to contribute to their planning process and to minimize the chances
needs definition, it is often too late to incor- of failure. Although the guidelines were
porate these into the system in the most effec. developed from the successful experiences of
tive manner. practitioners, the situations where organizations
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